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To be Fixed or not to be: 




¶1 In a move that is sure to send waves rippling through the legal arena, the Second 




¶2 In Cablevision II, the court evaluated the legal viability of a Remote Service–
Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) device that was prospectively to be released by the 
Cablevision company in 2006.  This new RS-DVR provided customers the ability to 
record various television programming, like a normal DVR, but instead of using the 
device to store the program, the storage of the programs would be housed by servers at 
Cablevision offices.  Numerous television networks, such as Twentieth Century Fox and 
Cartoon Networks, brought suit against Cablevision to prohibit the unveiling of this new 
technology.  The suit maintained that the process of the RS-DVR made illegal copies of 
the programming as prohibited under the Copyright Act, and Cablevision—not the 
consumer—was responsible for the illegal copies since the storage of the programming 
was being provided by Cablevision servers.  The networks also alleged that the RS-DVR 
infringed upon the network’s right to “perform the[ir] copyrighted work publicly” under 
§ 106 of the Copyright Act.
 (Cablevision II) that governs the application of the Copyright Act in 
today’s new era of digital technology. 
2
¶3 Part I of this paper will provide a detailed backdrop of the current state of the law 
concerning the Copyright Act and the presiding case on the topic. 
  The networks threatened Cablevision with an injunction to 
prohibit Cablevision’s rollout of the service unless Cablevision purchased licenses from 
the networks for the shows to be recorded and played. 
¶4 Part II of this paper will describe the process used by the Cablevision RS-DVR and 
how it allows the consumer to record television programs.  Part II will also describe how 
the RS-DVR differs from the VCR, the current DVR, and other technologies. 
¶5 Part III will detail the analysis that the District Court used in reaching its 
conclusion that the RS-DVR is more like a service than a device, the RS-DVR makes 
illegal copies of copyrighted programming, and the playback of the programming 
infringes on the rights of television networks to show their material publicly. 
¶6 Part IV will provide various stances on the outcome of the District Court’s 
decision.  Part V will also show how the Court of Appeals chose a different stance on this 
 
∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law 2010.  I would like to dedicate this 
article to my parents, Karl and Ruth Riley, for their unswerving support of all of my endeavors. 
1 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
2 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006). 
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issue and analyze how its stance deviates from the presiding precedent that holds when 
something is copied to a computer’s random access memory, a copy is made. 
¶7 In Part VI, I will hypothesize what the Supreme Court will decide on this issue as 
to whether the RS-DVR violates the Copyright Act of 1976 should the Court grant 
certiori. 
I. THE PAST BECOMES OBSOLETE 
¶8 The seminal case that has provided the background for this case is MAI Systems 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.3
A. MAI v. Peak 
 
¶9 In MAI, MAI Systems designed software to operate its computers, and Peak 
Computer, Inc. maintained MAI computers for various clients of MAI.4  Peak’s service of 
the computers included diagnosing routine problems and conducting necessary repairs 
using MAI’s programs.  In order to diagnose the computer problems while servicing a 
MAI computer, a Peak Technician would have to operate (turn on) the computer and 
utilize an unauthorized copy of MAI’s operating system (OS) software which was 
originally licensed to Peak’s customers.5  As MAI asserted that running programs that are 
licensed to another amounted to copyright infringement (unauthorized use), MAI applied 
for an injunction to prohibit Peak from running MAI software licensed to Peak 
customers, using unlicensed software at its headquarters, and loaning MAI computers and 
software to its customers.6
¶10 The MAI court was confronted with the question: how do we ascertain whether a 
copy has been made?  The court found that a claim of copyright infringement will prevail 
if a “‘copying’ of a protectable expression” goes beyond the scope of a license.
 
7  The 
Copyright Act defines “copies” as, “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a 
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device.”8  The Copyright Act then explains, “a work is ‘fixed’ in a 
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or 
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory 
duration.”9
¶11 MAI’s software license allowed only MAI customers to run its software; the 





3 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
4 Id. at 513. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 517.  The pertinent charge for the current analysis is the unauthorized use and copying of MAI’s 
software. 
7 Id. 
8 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
9 Id. 
10 MAI, 991 F.2d at 517. 
  When Peak ran the required maintenance on its customer’s 
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computers, the technician used MAI’s software to diagnose the problem.  This 
intrinsically meant that MAI’s software would be loaded onto the customer’s computer’s 
random access memory (RAM).  Although Peak claimed that this copy created in RAM 
was not “fixed”, the court found that the representation made in the RAM is “sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration;”11 therefore, Peak’s use of the software 
ventured beyond the scope of the software license and violated the Copyright Act.12
II. THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE –THE NEW DVR 
 
¶12 Before the suit, Cablevision prospectively sought to offer the RS-DVR as part of 
Cablevision’s cable service.  In order to give a full operative view of the technology 
utilized by the RS-DVR, I will first need to describe the technology used to deliver cable 
television to Cablevision customers. 
A. Cable 
1. Television and Cable Generally 
¶13 Television is the simultaneous transmission of video and audio signals.13  As 
opposed to sending television waves in analog form that are received by an antenna, 
“Cable” television is transmitted in digital form via a coaxial cable that is connected to a 
television set via a “set-top box.”14  A digital television can directly receive digital signals 
whereas an analog television cannot unless the television is connected to a set top box 
which converts the digital signal to an analog signal.15
2. Delivery to Customers 
 
¶14 Digital signals are transmitted from its source to the television in a compressed data 
form known as binary digits, or “bits.”16  Because of its compressed form, more signals 
can occupy the same space; therefore, the consumer has access to greater programming 
choices than with the analog signal.  Digital signals also provide a better audio and video 
feed for the customer.17
¶15 Cable’s programming begins with the network companies sending their television 




11 Id. at 519. 
12 Id. at 517. 
13 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 
610 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
14 Id. 
15 Wikipedia, Set-top box, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-top_box (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).  
(“Special digital set-top boxes are available for receiving digital television broadcasts on TV sets that do 
not have a built in digital tuner.”). 
16 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 610. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
  A head 
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end facility is a central facility that harbors much of the hardware and software that is 
needed to operate the cable company’s system as a whole.19
¶16  The cable company collects the feeds in single stream called an “aggregated 
programming stream” (APS).
 
20  The APS is comprised of packets of data that are noted 
with a “program identifier” (PID) that denotes which network or program to which it 
belongs.21  The APS is sent from the cable company’s head end to its customers via a 
process called “Quadrature Amplitude Modulation” (QAM) by way of devices called 
QAM modulators.22  The QAM converts the networks digital feed into radio frequency 
(RF) signals for easier transmission along the coaxial cable.23  These RF signals are sent 
to the vast networks of smaller cable systems that are comprised of the cable company’s 
homes.24  The smaller cable systems or nodes are operated by a specific QAM modulator 
that transmits the RF signal to the customer’s set-top box.25
¶17  The packets of the APS stream are then filtered and reassembled into a signal 
stream to be decrypted, decoded, and displayed.
 
26
B. Old-School Recording 
  Cable companies are able to regulate 
access to certain programming by encrypting certain packets in the APS, and the set-top 
box decrypts the packets in order to reveal the programming. 
1. Video Cassette Recorder (VCR) 
¶18 The first VCR, the Sony Betamax, was released in the 1970s.27  The device adapted 
the television signals and recorded them onto the magnetic tape within the video cassette 
for later playback at the customer’s discretion.28  This format was a dominant form of 
recording television programming until DVDs exploded on scene in the early 2000s.29
2. Set-Top Storage DVRs (STS-DVR) 
 
¶19 STS-DVRs can operate as a DVR and set top cable box; however, the STS-DVR 
can record the digital television programming directly without decoding the APS 
stream.30  The STS-DVR records the programming onto the internal hard drive housed in 
the DVR.  The device also may have two tuners that allow the customer to watch one 
television program while recording another program simultaneously, or record two 
channels at the same time.31
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 610. 
21 Id. at 610–11. 





27 Wikipedia, Videocassette Recorder, 




30 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 611–12. 
31 Id. at 612. 
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¶20 Once the programming has been recorded, it is ready for playback.  The customer 
can control the playback (i.e. pause, fast-forward, etc.) through different “trick modes.”32  
The length of recordable space is limited by the size of the hard drive.  The customer can 
only record programs for which the customer has paid; the STS-DVR does not allow the 
customer to record pay-per-view or Video-on-Demand programming.33
C. RS-DVR Technology 
 
1. Generally 
¶21 Cablevision’s RS-DVR differs from the STS-DVR in one main way.  It continues 
to record television programming for the customer, but the recorded programming is not 
saved to a hard drive within the DVR itself; the recorded programming is stored remotely 
on computer servers stationed at the cable company’s head ends.34  These servers are 
made up of multiple hard disks where every customer that subscribes to the service will 
be given a specific amount of storage space.  Only that customer can access his own 
respective storage space.35  The program would be stored indefinitely on the server until 
it is deleted by the customer or if it is overwritten by the customer on a “first in-first out” 
schedule.36
2. The RS-DVR technology 
 
¶22 Since the RS-DVR does not record the program on-site (at the place of the box), a 
summary of the technology that is used to record the television programming is 
necessary. 
¶23 The BarcoNet is a closed circuit network that transmits the APS for distribution for 
the cable company.37
¶24 Through a process called clamping, the BMR converts the RF signals to a stream 
that is even more efficient.
  Instead of allowing the APS to flow from the BarcoNet to the 
QAM Modulators, the APS is split in two streams: one to the QAM modulator for 
distribution to the customers without the RS-DVR and the other to different device called 
the “Big Band Broadband Multimedia Router” (BMR). 
38  During this process, the stream is placed in the BMR’s 
“buffer” memory.39  Buffers are regions of memory that temporarily hold data.  These 
buffers hold information as it moves to its destination.  The BMR also splits the stream 
into User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets.  These packets are assigned a port number 
that identifies the respective television channel to which they belong.40
¶25 This stream is then fed to the cable company’s servers that are at its head end.  
Each server can service up to ninety-six cable customers.  The servers then store the 








37 Id. at 613. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 614. 
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buffer for up to a tenth of a second.  The primary ingest buffer can hold enough packets 
that amount up to 3 frames of video from any of the channels carried by Cablevision.41  
The buffering takes place automatically, so if a customer requests a specific program, the 
respective packets can be found and recorded to the customer’s hard drive space.42
¶26 a) How the RS-DVR records.—The customer may record a program through two 
different ways.  The customer may scroll through the on screen program and set a timer 
by pressing record on the remote control, or the customer may press record while 
watching the program.  Once the customer has chosen the program, the remote sends a 
signal to the “Application Data Server” (ADS) to verify the following five components 
are available: (1) the program is within the customer’s cable subscription package, (2) the 
program has not been previously requested by the customer, (3) the customer has 
sufficient space on the hard drive for the program to be recorded, (4) the request will not 
result in two programs being recorded at the same time, and (5) the customer is 
authorized to receive the program in question.
 
43
¶27 Once the above components have been satisfied, the ADS alerts the “Oracle 
Production Server” (OPRD) which maintains a list of programs that have been requested 
for recording.
  If any of these components are not met, 
an error message will display and ask the customer to take various steps to remedy the 
situation. 
44  If the program has been previously requested by another customer, the 
OPRD will send an “asset ID,” which denotes the respective program, to the ADS; if the 
program has not been requested, the OPRD will generate a new asset ID.45  This ID is 
added to the OPRD’s list of programs.46  The ADS then communicates with the “Vitria” 
server, which is the only server to communicate with the Arroyo server.47
¶28 When it is time to record, the Vitria server sends a list of all the program requests 
to the Arroyo server which is holding the packets of that program in its buffer memory.
 
48  
The Arroyo server then searches for the respective packets of that program in the primary 
ingest buffer, and when found, it sends these packets to a secondary ingest buffer.  The 
copy is made in this second buffer and sent to the hard drive of each requesting customer.  
The customer is then notified by the Arroyo server that the copy was made and is ready 
for playback.49
¶29 b) Playback.—When the customer is ready to view the program, the customer 
selects the program from the on-screen menu.  This alerts the Arroyo server to begin 
interacting with the “Enterprise Session Resource Manager” (eSRM), which manages the 
playback process.  The eSRM streams the program through the QAM to the set-top box.  
The Arroyo server locates the recorded program, and sends the stream to the customer’s 
QAM.  The stream is then transmitted to every node that the QAM services, but only the 
  If no request for the program is made by the customer, then no copy is 





44 Id. at 615. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  The Arroyo server is where the program is stored until deleted by the customer.   
48 Id. at 615. 
49 Id. 
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requesting set-top box is provided with the key for decrypting the stream for viewing.50  
The customer is then able to manipulate playback through various trick modes once 
playback has commenced.  If too many customers are using their RS-DVR at the same 
time, the system will generate a “busy signal” and the streaming from the QAM and the 
Arroyo servers will be halted and an error message will be displayed suggesting another 
time to watch the recorded program.51
III. TAKE ONE –CABLEVISION I 
 
¶30 The Copyright Act of 1976 allows copyright owners to “reproduce the copyrighted 
work in copies” and in the case of audiovisual works, “perform the copyrighted work 
publicly.”52  In order to establish a claim of copyright infringement there are two 
requirements: (1) one must have ownership of a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized 
copying or a violation of rights given by the Copyright Act.53  After the court ascertained 
that the plaintiffs held valid ownership of the television programming that Cablevision 
showed to its customers, it subsequently analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims of whether 
Cablevision violated the Copyright Act by making unauthorized copies of the plaintiffs’ 
programming and by making unauthorized transmissions of the same.54
A. RS-DVR copies 
 
¶31 The plaintiffs asserted that Cablevision makes unauthorized copies by (1) making a 
copy of the program and storing it on the Arroyo servers and (2) temporarily storing the 
programs in Cablevision’s buffer memory.55
1. Arroyo Server Copies 
  
¶32 Cablevision does not deny that copies are made by the RS-DVR, but the ultimate 
question is who makes the copies.56  The plaintiffs likened Cablevision’s RS-DVR to a 
service and claimed that Cablevision is the entity who makes the copies.  Alternatively, 
Cablevision compared the RS-DVR to a VCR or a photocopier and claimed that the 
customer does the copying.57  The court sided with the plaintiffs for multiple reasons.58
¶33 The court reasoned that the RS-DVR is more like a service than a device and 
distinguished the product from a VCR.  The court differentiated the RS-DVR from the 
VCR, because the RS-DVR cannot be disconnected from the set-top box, connected 




50 Id. at 615–16.  
51 Id. at 616. 
52 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4). 
53 Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
54 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 612. 
55 Id. at 617. 
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id.  In Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court held that time-shifting is “fair use,” 
but according to the District Court, the plaintiffs waived any arguments on this basis.  The court continued 
on to the merits of the plaintiffs’ assertions. 
59 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 618. 
  The district court noted that the 
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RS-DVR, like a VCR, is a machine, but it is linked to a network of different servers.60  
Furthermore, the court distinguished the present case from Sony, for unlike in Sony, 
where the only point of contact the customer had with Sony was at the point of sale, the 
customer must keep an ongoing relationship with Cablevision in order to use the RS-
DVR as well.61  Cablevision not only owns the RS-DVR, but also maintains that the 
network is properly working, the court noted.62  Moreover, Cablevision determines which 
programming is available to the customer and how much memory to allocate to each 
customer.63
¶34 Cablevision, however, likened its RS-DVR to the STS-DVR, but the court did not 
give the argument much credence.  Cablevision pointed out that there have been no prior 
cases against cable providers for providing STS-DVRs to their customers, and 
comparatively, cable companies should not be liable for copyright infringement by 
providing RS-DVRs.
 
64  The court found this claim unavailing because of the changes 
needed in order to allow the RS-DVR to work (i.e. reconfiguring the linear channel 
programming, reformatting the stream, routing the stream to the Arroyo servers, etc.).65  
The STS-DVR, however, does not need any reconfiguration, and can record directly to 
the hard drive located within the set-top box.66  The court likened the RS-DVR to more of 
a Video-on-Demand service than a STS-DVR, as a Video-on-Demand service stores the 
copies at the network for on-demand viewing and is governed by licenses negotiated with 
copyright owners.67
¶35 Cablevision attempted to align itself with cases built on the premise that a company 
that makes a service available is not liable unless the company employees do the 
copying.
 
68  The court dismissed Cablevisions claim, and held that since Cablevision 
houses the machinery and systems, Cablevision would be “doing” the copying.69
¶36 Cablevision also relied on Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services, Inc.
 
70  In Netcom, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) server was 
not held liable for copyrighted material that was posted on a computer bulletin board 
service because “the court [did] not find a workable theory of infringement71 that would 
hold the entire internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.”72
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 618–19. 






68 See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Michigan Documents Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).  In both of these cases, 
professors gave copyrighted materials to print shops and the employees then copied the materials without 
obtaining permission from the authors of the original work.  The print shops were held liable under a theory 
that they actively committed the infringement as opposed to customers making prohibited copies on their 
own. 
69 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d. at 620. 
70 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
71 Id. at 1372. 
72 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
  The 
district court disagreed with Cablevision again.  It adduced that Cablevision is not like an 
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ISP, because it has more control over its programming and is not in as passive of a role as 
an ISP provider.73  Ultimately, the district court held that the Arroyo server copies 
constitute copyright infringement as a matter of law because the court determined that 
Cablevision made the copies of the television programming at the customer’s request.74
2. Buffer Copies 
 
The Copyright Act states “copies” are: 
[M]aterial objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or 
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, with directly or with the aid of a machine or device.  
The term “copies” includes the material object in which the work is first fixed. 75
Cablevision claimed that the buffer copies are so transient that they could not be fixed 
and should be denoted as “otherwise de minimis.”
 
 
76  However, the court found this claim 
lacking as well.  It found two reasons to dismantle the Cablevision’s assertion.  First, the 
court found that if the buffer copies are able to be reproduced, then the copies could not 
be claimed to be “de minimus.”77  Also, the court viewed the RS-DVR system in the 
aggregate (the process in whole) and found that although only a few seconds of television 
programming were in the buffer memory at a time, the whole television program could be 
copied, and therefore, the system could not be termed as “de minimus.”78
¶37  The court then analogized the RS-DVR copying to the copies that are made when 
software is uploaded into a computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM).  The court 
relied on precedent that has held that temporary copies of a work in RAM are generally 
“fixed” and meet the definition of copies as in the Copyright Act.
 
79  The district court 
then held that the buffer copies infringed on the plaintiffs’ copyrights as well.80
B. RS-DVR infringes on networks right to display works publicly (transmission) 
 
¶38 The Copyright Act states: 
To ‘perform’ a work means to recite render, play, dance, or act it, either directly 
or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds 
accompanying it audible.81
Cablevision did not deny that the recording of a program is a performance, yet the 






75 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
76 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph L.L.C. v. 
Bossard Assoc., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (loading of software into RAM is copying). 
80 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
81 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 332
was entirely passive, but the district court rejected it on the notion that the “operation of 
an array of computer servers” that cannot be considered passive.82
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . . 
to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the 
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same 
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
  Cablevision also 
argued that the performance was “fundamentally” private in nature. The Copyright Act 
defines a publicly performed work as: 
83
The court reasoned that a transmission is public “even if the members of the public 
receive the transmission at separate places at different times.”
 
 
84  It also held that where a 
transmission is performed in a commercial relationship, the transmission is made “to the 
public”.85
¶39 The court subsequently enjoined Cablevision from production of the RS-DVR and 
from using its system for “(1) copying plaintiff’s copyrighted works and (2) engaging in 
public performance[s]” of the same unless it procures licenses from the owner.
 
86
IV. DIFFERING OPINIONS 
 
¶40 Various entities had differing opinions on the ruling of Cablevision I.  This section 
is dedicated to eliciting these opinions and their bases. 
A. Amici for Cablevision 
1. Theory distinction of direct vs. secondary liability 
¶41 In their brief,87 the Center for Democracy and Technology attacks the Cablevision I 
decision on its categorization of Cablevision as a direct infringer.88  The Center for 
Democracy and Technology argues Cablevision is not a direct infringer, because 
Cablevision does not control the use of recording by the customer.89  Rather, Cablevision 
should at most be liable for secondary liability or contributory infringement, for 
Cablevision merely “owns an electronic facility that responds automatically to users’ 
input.”90  In Cablevision’s case, it argues that the volition or necessary “nexus” 
requirement is lacking.91
 
82 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622.  Compare with Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, 
Inc. 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984) (one who operates the controls “performs” because that activity 
results in the sequential showing of the movie’s images accompanied by sound). 
83 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). 
84 Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
85 See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(performance may still be public even though it reaches members of the public at different times and 
places). 
86 Cablevision I, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
87 Brief for Ctr. for Democracy and Tech. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants (Ctr. for 
Democracy Brief), Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No.07-1480). 
88 Id. at 6. 
89 Id. at 8. 
90 Costar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004). 
  Furthermore, Sony held that a person cannot be secondarily 
91 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) (to prove 
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liable for infringement for technology that is “capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.”92  Since Cablevision’s video programming is already licensed and legal, 
Cablevision should not need another license just because the company provides a system 
to allow customers to watch the programming at their leisure.93  The programming is the 
same whether the feed goes to the “customer’s television set, cable box, VCR or home 
DVR,” and therefore, Cablevision should not be liable as a direct or secondary 
infringer.94
2. Buffer copies are not copies 
 
¶42 Many professors around the country took a different approach to vindicate 
Cablevision’s claims.  In their amicus curiae brief,95 the law professors conclude the 
buffer copies that are made through Cablevision’s system are not sufficiently fixed and 
argue that momentary reproductions that are “necessarily created” during digital 
processes and “which are destroyed almost immediately after they are created” are not 
fixed copies.96
¶43 The law professors disagree with the Cablevision I decision because it does not 
distinguish between the time the copies are made in the buffer and it does not follow the 
intent of the Copyright Act.
 
97  A House of Representatives Report explicitly excludes 
from the definition of works that are fixed, “evanescent or transient reproductions such as 
those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television . . . or captured 
momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”98  Moreover, the Copyright Office believes 
that the Copyright Act excluded from infringement all reproductions from which 
economic value can be derived.99  Since the district court held that 3 frames of video 
lasting less than one tenth of a second100 satisfied the fixed threshold of the Copyright 
Act,101 most digital devices would lose their use, and the Law Professors argue that the 
Copyright did not intend to exclude all copies such as Cablevision’s.102
 
infringement the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants themselves copied his work and that hey 
‘improperly appropriated’ his expression); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[T]o prevail on a contributory infringement claim, a plaintiff must show direct 
infringement by a third party.”) 
92 Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
93 See Ctr. for Democracy Brief, supra note 87, at 6–8. 
94 Id. at 6. 
95 Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants (Law Professors Brief), Cartoon 
Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No.07-1480).  
96 Id. at 3–4. 
97 Id. at 18. 
98 H.R. Rep. No 94-1476, at 53 (1976). 
99 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA Section 104 Report at 111 (Aug. 2001) (DMCA Report), available 
at http://www.copyright.gov/_reports/_studies/_dmca/sec- 104-_report-_ bol-_1.pdf. 
100 Law Professors Brief, supra note 95 at 5; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
101 Law Professors Brief, supra note 95 at 7 (“The material object is ‘sufficiently permanent or stable’ so 
that it can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated ‘for a period of more than transitory 
duration.’ 17 U.S.C. § 101.”). 
102 See Law Professors Brief, supra note 95 at 17–26. 
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3. Policy arguments 
¶44 The implications of the decision of Cablevision I would be drastic. The Center for 
Democracy and Technology claims that the innovation of remote servers103 “reduces the 
need for local storage devices and offers greater security and better disaster recovery.”104  
If Cablevision I is affirmed, the Center believes that this would curb beneficial 
innovation, like Cablevision’s RS-DVR system, by making products too expensive due to 
increased licensing fees or make licensing software an “impractical impossibility.”105
B. Amici against Cablevision 
  
The Copyright Act did not intend to chill technological advances. 
1. Progress and Freedom Foundation 
¶45 The Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF) argues in its brief106 that Cablevision 
should not escape liability as a direct infringer because they assert a substantial amount of 
control over the RS-DVR.107  Cablevision “selects the content at issue as well as 
maintains physical control of the programming and the copies throughout,”108 and PFF 
argues that Cablevision should not get to hide behind the customer.109  Cablevision’s 
control of the material, PFF argues, “take this case well out of the realm of cases 
involving photocopy machines, the VCR , and the Internet . . . it simply restore[s] the 
incentives of both sides to negotiate further licenses.”110
¶46 PFF further argues that the need for licensure when new technologies develop does 
not leave one side winning and the other side losing.
 
111  The organization alludes that 
innovation and production of material could be halted if the District Court’s decision 
were to be overturned.112  PFF claims the Cablevision I decision keeps Cablevision’s 
incentive to license quality material and also asserts the providers of quality material will 
be compensated and incentivized to continue to produce material.113
V. TAKE TWO 
  Therefore, the 
holding in Cablevision I does not run contrary to the intent of the Copyright Act. 
¶47 The Court of Appeals for the Second District reviewed the district court on three 
matters: (1) whether the copyrighted materials were “fixed” as defined under the 
 
103 Examples include Apple’s .mac, which allows consumer to back up the contents of the computers, 
and Google Docs, which allows for sharing of documents and information.   
104 Ctr. for Democracy Brief, supra note 87, at 23. 
105 Id. at 25. 
106 Brief for Progress & Freedom Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees (PFF Brief), 
Cartoon Network LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121(2d Cir. 2008) (No.07-1480). 
107 See id. at 4–8. 
108 Id. at 4. 
109 Id. at 4–5. 
110 Id. at 3. 
111 See id. at 8–9. 
112 Id. at 9–10 (“In a nutshell, content must be protected, or it will not be produced.”). 
113 Id. 
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Copyright Act, (2) whether Cablevision made the copies, and (3) whether the 
transmissions were performed “to the public.”114
A. Court of Appeals’ Take on MAI 
 
¶48 The court first addressed whether Cablevision makes the copies.  It looked at the 
Copyright Act and determined that the language required satisfaction of two components: 
(1) the work must be embodied in a medium (embodiment requirement) and (2) it must 
remain embodied “for a period of more than transitory duration” (the duration 
requirement).115
¶49 The court held that the district court’s reliance on MAI was erroneous because the 
case did not discuss the duration requirement, and thus, the case was not applicable to the 
present situation.
  If both components are not met, then no copy has been made. 
116  Also, the court factually distinguished the present case from MAI 
because it assumed that the program was embodied in the RAM for “at least several 
minutes” whereas the television programs are held in the buffer stream for 1.2 seconds.117  
Ultimately, the appellate court interpreted MAI to hold that loading a copyrighted 
program can, but does not always, result in a copying of that program.118  Similarly, the 
court found the district court’s strict reliance on a Copyright Office’s report was 
improper119 as such a report is not binding and only persuasive authority.  The appellate 
court found support in another MAI case, Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc. 
v. MAI Systems Corporation,120 which dealt with a similar matter.  In Advanced 
Computer Services, the court stated a program may be too ephemeral if a computer had 
been shut down “within seconds or fractions of a second” after loading the copyrighted 
program.121  Therefore, the court only gave the Copyright Office’s report persuasive 
power.122  Since there wasn’t any precedent indicating that there was a duration 
requirement within the definition of “fixed,” the court turned to evaluating the claims that 
the copyrighted material was “fixed” and therefore a copy within the meaning of the 
Copyright Act.123
¶50 Cablevision did not dispute that the works were embodied in the buffer, and the 




114 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2008). 
115 Id. at 127. 
116 Id.  (“[I]n general, those cases conclude that an alleged copy is fixed without addressing the duration 
requirement.”); id. at 128 (“This omission suggests that the parties did not litigate the significance of the 
‘transitory duration’ language, and the court therefore had no occasion to address it.”). 
117 Id. at 129. 
118 Id. at 128. 
119 DMCA Report, supra note 99 (unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be 
copied, perceived or communicated). 
120 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994) 
121 Id. at 363. 
122 Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 129.   
123 Id. 
124 See id. at 129 (when only a part of a work is in a buffer the result may be different, but when the 
whole work is placed second by second in the buffer, the work has been embodied in the buffer).   
  Relying on the notion that the data remains in the buffer for no 
longer than 1.2 seconds, the court factually distinguished this case from MAI and 
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determined that the duration requirement was not met, and thus no copy was made.125
B. Court of appeals take on the playback copies 
  
The court did not rule on the question of whether the data would be “de minimus.” 
¶51 In answering the question of who makes the playback copies, the present court 
dissected the district court’s analysis of the Netcom case.  The district court limited this 
decision to the realm of the internet; however, the appellate court expanded its holding to 
apply in this instance, also relying on a Fourth Circuit concurrence.126  The district court 
did not believe that Cablevision was sufficiently distinguishable from a “company that 
merely makes photocopiers available to the public or a VCR user.”127  The court validated 
this conclusion by stating there was a difference between “making a request to a human 
employee who then volitionally operates the copying system . . . and issuing a command 
directly to a system which automatically obeys commands.”128  Rather, the appellate 
court likened Cablevision to a copy store that charges its customers to make copies on its 
premises.129
¶52 The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s analysis regarding the 
discretion of programming by Cablevision.  The court reasoned that Cablevision is more 
a conduit than a volitional decision maker.
 
130  Cablevision did not have any power over 
which programming would be shown on its channels; only the television networks had 
that discretion.  Cablevision merely provides the opportunity for customers to watch.  
Using this analysis along with Sony,131
¶53 Furthermore, to draw the distinction between direct and contributory liability, the 
appellate court contrasted the Patent Act and the Copyright Act.  The Patent Act grants 
direct liability for the one committing the infringement and for the one who induces the 
infringement
 the court reasoned that Cablevision should be 
liable on a theory of contributory liability, not direct liability. 
132 while, “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for 
infringement committed by another.”133
 
125 Id. at 130 (“While our inquiry is necessarily fact-specific, and other factors not present here may alter 
the duration analysis significantly these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in 
the buffer ‘for only a ‘transitory’ period, thus failing the duration requirement.”). 
126 Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (direct liability should involve some form of volition or causation which is lacking where 
defendant’s system is used to create the copy); see also CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 
551 (4th Cir. 2004) (The court found it “a particularly rational interpretation of § 106” rather than a special 
purpose rule applicable only to ISPs.).  
127 Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 131. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 132. 
131 Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984) (it is just to impose liability on a party in a “position to 
control” the infringing uses of another, but as a contributory, not direct, infringer). 
132 35 U.S.C § 271(a)–(b) (2006) (gives direct liability to the person who “actively induces infringement 
of a patent and the person who induces that infringement).   
133 Sony, 464 U.S. at 434. 
  Since Congress wrote this in the Patent Act and 
not in the Copyright Act, the court reasoned Congress did not intend direct liability for 
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persons who induce a copyright infringement.134  Subsequently, the court held that 
Cablevision is not directly liable for the playback copies.135
C. Court of Appeals take on transmission of Playback 
 
¶54 Lastly, the court addressed the theory that Cablevision infringes on the right to 
perform a work publicly.  The court looked at the definitional section of the Copyright 
Act to determine what “publicly” means; there are two definitions under the Act, and the 
court determined that the first definition did not apply to Cablevision.  The second part of 
the definition defines to perform a work publicly as: 
 
“to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a 
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance of 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or 
at different times.”136
Although the statute does not define the term “performance” or “to the public,” the court 
found that a transmission of a performance is itself a performance, which was also 




¶55  The court then turned to determining who is “capable of receiving” a particular 
transmission or performance.  Cablevision argued that the performance is not “to the 
public” because the customer is the only one capable of receiving the playback copy, and 
the appellate court agreed.
 
138  Looking to the Copyright Act, the court criticized their 
reading of the Act because its reasoning would make every performance “to the public” 
and render the “to the public” language superfluous.139  Undoubtedly, the Copyright Act 
envisioned transmissions or performances that were not “to the public.”140
¶56  The plaintiffs asserted that to perform a work publicly, Congress meant “transmit 
. . . the ‘original performance’ . . . to the public” and thus have to determine the audience 
of any transmission of the same underlying “original” performance, not just the 
performance of the unique performance.
 
141  The court rejected this theory, and limited the 
determination of the audience to the transmission that occurred and not to the intended 
audience of the ‘original’ performance because it was not germane with prior 
interpretations of the transmit clause.142
 
134 Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 133. 
135 Id. 
136 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
137 Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134 (“The fact the statues says ‘capable of receiving a performance’ 
instead of ‘capable of receiving the transmission,’ underscores the fact that a transmission of a performance 
is itself a performance.); see also Buck v. Jewell–La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1931). 
138 See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135–137.  
139 Id. at 135–136 (“We cannot reconcile the district court’s approach with the language of the transmit 
clause.  That clause speaks of people capable of receiving a particular ‘transmission’ or ‘performance’, and 
not the potential audience of a particular ‘work.’  Doubtless the potential audience for every copyrighted 
audiovisual work is the general public.”). 
140 Id. at 136. 
141 Id. 
  Relying on NFL and limiting this holding to only 
142 In National Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture (NFL), 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000), 
the same court held, “the most logical interpretation . . . is to hold that a public performance or display 
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transmissions whose final link was “to the public,” the court held that NFL was 
inapplicable to the current case.143  Similarly, the Court distinguished the district court’s 
reliance on Redd Horne144 and On Command145
¶57  Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded all of district Court’s holdings and 
absolved Cablevision of any liability theories asserted by the plaintiffs. 
 because it held Cablevision’s 
performance is not by definition “to the public.” 
VI. THE END GAME 
¶58 In order to ascertain what the Supreme Court will do, I will need to give a 
background of previous decisions by the Supreme Court on the topic. 
A. Sony v. Universal 
¶59 In Sony v. Universal,146
¶60 The court held that the sale of VTRs to the general public does not constitute 
contributory infringement of the copyrights.
 Sony was sued by Universal and Disney for its sale of 
Video Tape Recorders (VTRs) that were able to record television programs that were 
broadcast on public airwaves.  Universal claimed this recording infringed on the 
respondent’s copyrights, and thus, Sony should be liable for the infringement.   
147  The holding was supported by various 
theories.  The Court first reasoned that any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work 
for a “fair use” and the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a 
use.148  The court also reasoned that the sale of the VTRs does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate purposes or is merely capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses.149  Furthermore, the court found that any time-shifting 
that was completed would cause minimal harm, and thus should qualify for legitimate fair 
use.150
B. What the Supreme Court should decide?  
 
¶61 Before I begin my analysis, I want to take a step back and think about one question:  
What is RS-DVR and what is its primary purpose? 
¶62 The RS-DVR is a DVR that records television programming off-site.  All the 
essential technological processes and equipment needed to store the programming off-site 
is quite similar to the processes needed for the DVR to store programming locally.  The 
 
includes each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience.”  The court 
limited this holding to only performances that resulted in transmissions to the public. 
143 Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 137. 
144 The court distinguished Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 
1984), because the contested performance was from one copy played multiple times to different people. 
145 The court distinguished On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F. Supp. 
787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991), because it ruled any commercial transmission is a transmission “to the public” 
and the court invalidated this claim through earlier reasoning. 
146 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
147 Id. at 456. 
148 Id. at 433. 
149 Id. at 440. 
150 Id. at 496. 
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only difference between the DVR and the RS-DVR is the location of the storage of the 
programming.  One can imagine the intricate network of equipment and processes needed 
for the RS-DVR to function as a DVR with a long universal serial bus (USB) cord to the 
head-end facility, or as an extension of the DVR itself.  Therefore, inherent in this 
premise, if the RS-DVR violates the Copyright Act, then the DVR also violates the 
Copyright Act. 
¶63 Since the RS-DVR can be considered one big machine or a DVR with a long USB 
cord, it can be used in the same analysis as the VTR in Sony.  In Sony, the VTRs 
completed much the same function as the RS-DVR; the VTR recorded television 
programs, and created the ability for a customer to watch the show at its convenience.  As 
reasoned by the Sony Court, the television networks benefit from the delayed viewing by 
the consumer,151
¶64 As in Sony where the Court held that a maker of equipment that can be used to 
infringe copyrights cannot be held as a direct or contributory infringer if the equipment 
may be widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes or substantial “fair 
use[s],”
 and the same benefit should be obtained by the RS-DVR.  Essentially, 
the RS-DVR only allows consumers the opportunity to watch television episodes at their 
leisure and the Supreme Court should deem this fair use. 
152
¶65 To bring this article full circle to the fixed medium and copy debate between the 
district court and the Second Circuit, their reliance on whether buffer copies are made, 
the playback copies violate the Copyright Act, and if the performance is “to the public” is 
misplaced.  Their analysis could have simply been shortened had the courts took a step 
back to look at the bigger picture.  After the courts verified that the copies that were made 
by the RS-DVR ensured that only the customer could watch his own recordings, the next 
step should have moved to Sony analysis.  Yes, a copy is made—even with the VTR in 
the early 1980s—but like the Second Circuit noted, not all copies violate the Copyright 
Act.
 the RS-DVR provides the customer the opportunity to view programming 
which the customer has already paid.  The networks did not derive any further revenue 
from the copies made by the VTRs in Sony, and the networks should not derive any 
further revenue from a newer form of technology that completes the same task. 
153  Furthermore, all performances of copyrighted works are not “to the public.”154
 
151 Id. at 443–47. 
152 See id. at 435–42. 
153 Id. at 443–57. 
154 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
  
Using this analysis, the Supreme Court should follow their Sony precedent, hold that the 
RS-DVR has substantial fair uses, and find Cablevision not directly liable for any 
infringement caused by the RS-DVR. 
